Gödel and two models of provability

S.N. Artemov, CUNY Graduate Center, New York

Abstract: Gödel's papers of 1933 and 1938 left open two problems concerning
  1. a semantics of proofs for the modal logic S4 and thus for the intuitionistic logic;
  2. the modal logic of the standard provability predicate Provable(x).
Problem (b) was solved in 1976 by Solovay who established the arithmetical completeness of the Gödel-Löb modal logic GL with respect to the provability semantics of □F.
Problem (a) found its solution in 1995 via the Logic of Proofs LP. These two models of provability complement each other targeting their own areas of application. S4/LP captures Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic logic, epistemic logic with justifications, typed lambda-calculus, modal lambda-calculus. GL expresses the Second Incompleteness Theorem, Löb Theorem and other profound provability principles. In this talk we will discuss recent developments and open problems in this area.